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Back in the early 1990s when a section of the American foreign policy think
tank and the intelligentsia were euphorically forecasting scenarios for the
consolidation of western victory in the Cold War, James Woolsey, then head
of the US Central Intelligence Agency forewarned that the widely celebrated
victory and transition to the post-Cold War era was akin to the West, hav-
ing slain the dragon (of Soviet threat), now living in a jungle full of poison-
ous snakes (Woolsey 1993). There can hardly be a better metaphoric repre-
sentation of the post-9/11 projection of American power in the postcolonial
world, especially in Africa. This article argues that the US-led war on terror
tends to reinforce the crisis of postcoloniality in Africa by deliberately pro-
ducing metaphors, images, discourses, doctrines and policies aimed at mag-
nifying and mainstreaming terrorism scares on the turbulent politico-eco-
nomic landscape of Africa, as a means to justify imperial governance and
supervision. It is a project that ideologically feeds into influential
transhistorical discourses and portrayal of Africa as a timespace of infanti-
lism, requiring endless western propping and chaperoning. Evidently, Afri-
can political regimes serve as satellite collaborators in the enterprise in a
trajectory that the author captures within the discursive framework of
postcoloniality.
Résumé
Au début des années 1990, lorsqu’une partie du groupe de réflexion américain
en matière de politique étrangère et l’intelligentsia prévoyaient
* Professor of International Relations, United States International University, Nairobi,
Kenya. Email: komeje@usiu.ac.ke
4. Omeje.pmd 04/12/2009, 20:0189
90 AJIA 11: 2, 2008
euphoriquement des scénarios pour la consolidation de la victoire de l’Occident
dans la guerre froide, James Woolsey, qui était alors le chef de l’Agence centrale
de renseignement (CIA) des États-Unis, avait averti que la victoire largement
célébrée, ainsi que la transition vers la période d’après-guerre froide, était à
l’image de l’Occident, qui, après avoir tué le dragon (la menace soviétique),
vit maintenant dans une jungle pleine de serpents venimeux. Il ne peut guère
y avoir une meilleure représentation métaphorique de l’image post-11
septembre de la puissance américaine dans le monde postcolonial, en
particulier en Afrique. Cet article soutient que la guerre contre la terreur
menée par les États-Unis d’Amérique tend à renforcer la crise de la
postcolonialité en Afrique en produisant délibérément des métaphores, des
images, des discours, des doctrines et des politiques visant à amplifier la
peur du terrorisme dans le turbulent paysage politico-économique de l’Afrique.
Ceci se trouve être un moyen de justifier la gouvernance et la supervision
impériales. Il s’agit d’un projet qui est idéologiquement fondé sur des discours
transhistoriques influents et la représentation de l’Afrique comme un espace
d’infantilisme, qui nécessite le soutien et le chaperonnage interminables de
l’Occident. Evidemment, les régimes politiques africains servent de
collaborateurs satellites dans cette entreprise, dans une trajectoire que l’auteur
place dans le cadre discursif de la postcolonialité.
Introduction
Contrary to Crawford Young’s (2004) postulate proclaiming the [prob-
able] demise of the postcolonial moment, the postcolonial era has not
passed. It has basically been reconfigured and reinvented. Young
(2004:23-24) speculates that there has been a demise of the ‘postcolonial
moment’ in Africa since about the year 1990. He attributes the historic
demise to the convoluted forces of market liberalisation and democrati-
sation in Africa, which have eroded the silent incorporation of many
defining characteristics of the colonial state in its post independence
successor for the preceding three decades. 1990 is designated as the
terminal postcolonial period because this was the year when the unfold-
ing transformations came full cycle with a multitude of new functional
and dysfunctional actors (informal traders, smugglers, warlords, arms
traffickers, youth militias, local associations, women’s organisations,
religious groups and refugees) entering the political space and interact-
ing with state agents and international agencies (Young 2004:24-25). In
the end, Young details the decay and disintegration of the postcolonial
state but fails to tell us what has replaced it and what has become of the
sociocultural and sundry concomitants of postcoloniality in Africa.
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I argue in this article that the emerging politics and discourses of
imperial chaperoning in Africa and how African political regimes relate
to them, midwifing, facilitating and trying to maximise the political and
economic opportunities and possibilities attendant to the process attest
to the contemporary reinvention of postcoloniality. Incidentally, these
processes were already unfolding when Young declared in 2004 that ‘the
postcolonial moment has passed.’ Perhaps, he only needed to have
searched a little deeper. Reminiscent of the famous essays of Francis
Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, and Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Uni-
polar Moment’, that both celebrated the end of the Cold War, Young’s
article presumes that the onset of the crisis of patrimonial decline in the
1980s and the backlash of developmentalism in the 1990s, culminating
in the emergency of failed and turbulent states, have conspired to erode
the currency and discourse of the postcolonial state, if not the entire
project of ‘stateness’ in Africa (Young 2004:23-49).
The postcolonial state and postcoloniality could not have ended in a
sudden ‘moment’ as the Cold War did when its essential underlying
structures (mostly physical) in the communist bloc and the Soviet Un-
ion disintegrated. The structures of postcoloniality are both physical and
mental/social, such that even if the physical disintegrates, the mental
and social component could still sustain and perpetuate the phenom-
enon for a long time, perhaps for generations. The physical aspect is the
political and economic structures inherited from the colonial dispensa-
tion, which privilege the metropole (ex-colonial masters and the West)
and the local postcolonial political elites. The mental and social aspect,
elaborately analysed by Mbembe (2001) and which Young ironically ac-
knowledged, are ‘the practices, routines and mentalities’ (see Young
2004:23) that reinforce the social relations of postcoloniality. There are
two sides to these social relations. The first is the relations between the
metropole and postcolonial state, especially the subservient local
hegemonic elites. The second is the relations between the postcolonial
elites and the subject classes – relations that involve a nexus of coercion,
cooptation, manipulation and cooperation, depending on the rhythm of
balance of power between the local elite and the disparate subject groups
and political constituencies. It is the occasional tendency by many sub-
ject communities and groups to cooperate with, and to hero-worship,
the hegemonic potentates as ‘a fetish to which the subject is bound’ that
Mbembe (2001:104-110) generalised as the ‘logic of conviviality’ facili-
tating the smooth running of the potentate’s postcolony.
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Suffice it to argue that postcoloniality and the postcolonial state still
thrive in both their physical and mental/social forms. The post 9/11 dis-
courses, systems and structures of imperial supervision and governance
have contributed significantly to a strengthening of the external social
relations and structures of postcoloniality. However, the processes tend
to weaken the domestic aspect of postcolonial social fabric given the
marked resentment and opposition of many African (un)civil societies
to the intrigues and role of their political leaders in the anti-terrorism
campaign. Put differently, it is apparent that the war on terror is acceler-
ating the breakdown of structures of Mbembe’s perceived ‘conviviality’
between African rulers and sections of their subjects while conversely
consolidating the logic of conviviality between the postcolonial political
elites in Africa and the metropolitan hegemonies.
Pattern of Underlying Intellectual and Policy Discourses
Many African states are evidently beleaguered, fractured and straggling.
As such, discourses of postcoloniality are awash with concepts, repre-
sentations and qualifiers that depict most postcolonial and African states
as strictly non-state and sub-state human and institutional entities. In-
ternational Relations (IR) theories, Comparative Political Economy
(CPE) and neo-Weberian Historical Sociology (n-WHS) are some of
the dominant specialisms that have extensively studied contemporary
postcolonial states – their nature, problems and challenges. A dominant
feature of many influential studies on the African states within the above
specialisms is their western-centric epistemology and its associated ten-
dency to generalise, exaggerate and deride the dysfunctionality of the
state in Africa, including their security vulnerabilities and the so-called
threats to the outside world. Fragile, malleable, weak, regressive, failed
or in the danger of failing – the state in Africa (sometimes categorised
without exceptions) is portrayed by mainstream western-centric theo-
rists as posing mortal threats to both its citizens and the ‘civilized world’.
In the post-9/11 world of threat-mongering, there has been a significant
and perplexing high level policy buy-in to this philosophy. African secu-
rity vulnerabilities (real, imagined or exaggerated) are reconstructed into
rhetoric of pathological danger. Terror pervades the ‘dark continent’.
Discourses, doctrines, policies and scenarios of imperial intervention,
supervision and governance are developed and unfolded to tame the
untamed (i.e. the ‘micro-jungle’1 and its teeming ‘poisonous snakes’).
The vulnerable and unruly infant cannot be left unchaperoned.
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Placed in a historical perspective from their establishment under co-
lonial rule to the era of political independence, from decolonisation to
the tribulations of state-making, most African and postcolonial states
have hardly ceased to fall under direct and indirect western imperial stere-
otyping, supervision, subjection and governance. Whether in the pre-
colonial (trans-Atlantic slave trade), colonial and postcolonial eras, Af-
ricans have been depicted as ‘a special human type,’ ‘a child type’ – ‘with
child psychology and outlook’ - ‘who can never grow up, a child race’
(see Mamdani 1996:4).  This vein of ideological construction has pro-
vided practical justifications for imperialist interventions in Africa, which
have often been couched in such humanitarian discourses and disguises
as the necessity to ‘civilise’, ‘reform’, ‘modernise’, ‘develop’, ‘protect’,
‘liberate’, ‘emancipate,’ and ‘strengthen’. In this ideology and discourse
of ‘help from above’ (the West), Africa is portrayed as a timespace of
infantilism, requiring endless western propping and chaperoning. The
consequence of this is a montage of imperiums that paradoxically ‘re-
form’ and ‘deform’, ‘modernise’ and ‘destabilise’, ‘develop’ and
‘underdevelop’. From (pre)colonial mercantilism to the laissez faire im-
perialism of the Victorian era, from ‘post-Second World War liberal in-
ternationalism’ (Gardner 1990; Mosley 2005) to the post-Cold War
unipolar triumphalism (see Krauthammer 2003), African social fabrics
are arbitrarily disfigured, unsettled and reconfigured to meet a complexus
of ‘extraverted interests’ (Bayart 2000). African states, peoples and
hegemonic elites are consigned to constantly grapple with the changing
paradigms of the politics of extraversion, subjection and chaperoning, as
well as to compete for the nuanced empowering opportunities and pos-
sibilities that unfold.
Until the tragic 9/11 terrorist incidents, expectations that the end of
the Cold War could lead to a ‘peace dividend’ in the international sys-
tem remained considerably high, not least among the American public.
The successive US administrations, however, did not share this illusion
and as such remained committed to what General John M. Shalikashvili
(then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in 1996 termed ‘full spec-
trum dominance’ (Bacevich 2002:127), marked by a worldwide projec-
tion of American military power. Nonetheless, the illusion of the White
House and the US foreign policy think-tank that ‘the international com-
munity is far more likely to enjoy peace under the power projections of
a single hegemon’ – a phenomenon gratuitously described by Charles
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Krauthammer as ‘a uniquely benign imperium’ (quoted in Rogers
2002:116) – was all shattered by the gruesome events of 9/11 2001.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 incidents, America’s post-Cold War uni-
polar triumphalism and ‘full spectrum dominance’ have apparently re-
clined to a systematic militaristic imperium over the vast postcolonial
states of Africa and elsewhere in the South. The principal rhetoric of the
sprawling imperium is the security of American citizens, American stra-
tegic interests and those of its western allies. Within this new configura-
tion of post-9/11 imperial governance, African postcolonies, especially
the vast Sahalian belt and the interlocking areas of the Arab Maghreb,
West Africa, the Horn and Great Lakes regions, with large Islamic
populations, are depicted and castigated with a profusion of cognomens
and phraseologies aimed to justify US and, to lesser extent, western
intrusion, subjection, manipulation and chaperoning and, if necessary,
military invasion and occupation. In the foreign policy industries of the
US, UK and many EU governments, as well as in mainstream IR, CPE
and n-WHS literature, narratives of most African postcolonial states are
inundated with despicable images and pathological references such as:
‘chaos and barbarism’, ‘criminal anarchy’, ‘large uncontrolled and un-
governed territories’, ‘breeding ground for international terrorists’, ‘po-
tential havens for terrorist activities’, ‘hotbeds of instability’, ‘Tora Bora
for talibanisation’, ‘incorrigibly delinquent countries’(Kaplan 1994;
Keenan 2004).
Furthermore, and at a more ideological level, pathological construc-
tions of Africa as a site for terror, insurgency and anarchy have even
transcended proposals on the urgency of American imperial governance
under the aegis of the war on terror, to some seemingly bizarre discourses
on scenarios and possible justifications for ‘benign recolonisation.’ Robert
Jackson, Andrew Linklater, Gerald Helman and Steve Ratner, and other
proponents of this view advocate a ‘reformation of decolonisation’
through ‘new instruments of global stewardship’ or ‘some forms of in-
ternational government’ akin to the mandate system of the defunct League
of Nations over ‘failed states and failing states and weak states’, ‘not
able to stand on their feet in the international system' (Linklater 1996).
Helman and Ratner (1993:12) argue that these forms of ‘guardianship
and trusteeship’ are ‘a common response to broken families, serious
mental or physical illness or economic destitution’ and thus should be
invoked on the plight of failed states, preferably by the UN. Benign
recolonisation arising from discourses of pathological danger and infan-
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tilism, as in all preceding historical discourses of African vulnerability, is
rationalised by a humanitarian rhetoric, notably to bolster state sover-
eignty and to protect vulnerable populations on the grounds that sover-
eignty wrongly privileges order over justice (Linklater 1996:108-109;
see Morton 2005 for a critique of these views). Proposing a regime of
imperial governance to combat terrorism, spread development and sal-
vage failed and failing states, the British ex-Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw,
articulates for the West a hypothetical scenario for division of govern-
ance responsibilities over ‘the new and old Third Worlds.’2 ‘This could
mean’, argued Straw, ‘the EU, NATO or the OSCE (Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe) taking the lead in dealing with
problems around the margins of Europe; the French or ourselves (per-
haps jointly), in parts of Africa and countries like Canada or the US
under the OAS (organisation of American States) in the America’ (Chan-
dler 2002).
Most discourses and narratives of ‘benign recolonisation’ (an appar-
ent disguise for imperial diktat) and imperial governance are riddled
with superficialities. Pertinent questions such as the underlying socio-
economic circumstances and political specificities of the failed states, as
well as the role of disparate conflict stakeholders, including local politi-
cal elites, regional and external forces are usually glossed over. Instead,
state decline, disintegration and breakdown are construed as inexorable
congenital and pathological processes. Also, more legitimate possibili-
ties of conflict resolution and state reconstruction such as constructive
capacitation and use of regional organisations such as ECOWAS, AU,
and SADC are hardly contemplated by these African sympathisers and
this is in spite of the recent considerable peacekeeping successes achieved
by ECOMOG (the ECOWAS intervention force) in Sierra Leone, Libe-
ria, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Iviore.3 Consequently, a growing number
of ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs) in the South (e.g. Cambodia,
Somalia, Congo DR, Haiti), including the US preemptive (in reality
preventive) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that it is indeed
more difficult to achieve the recomposition and restoration of failed states
through a quasi-colonial or neo-imperial extraversion and internation-
alisation of sovereignty than otherwise. State sovereignty by its very
nature – the Westphalia legacy or benchmark – is wary of, and resistant
to, internationalisation. The sovereignty of fractured states can be best
fixed through proactive processes of ‘intra-nationalisation’ and
regionalisation.  Regionalisation of the sovereignty of failed states has
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basically worked in Africa for two apparent reasons. The first is that a
large number of civil wars and contemporary CPEs in Africa have pro-
found regional content, a phenomenon associated with the fluidity of
peoples among ethnonational groups and communities straddling inter-
national borders, the arbitrary nature of most international boundaries
and the centrality of lootable natural resources (conflict goods) to Afri-
can political economies. The second factor is largely sociocultural – the
idiom and principles of fraternity, collectivism and synergism, which ob-
ligates the African to help extinguish the raging ‘fire next door’ (Francis
2001:1), thereby ‘checkmating’ its spread and ruinous effects. This fac-
tor is empirically enhanced by the existence of some relatively viable
diplomatic and political channels and structures for dispute settlement
within African regional organisations, coupled with the use of semi-for-
mal processes of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
Rhetoric of Violence, Ungoverned Spaces and Danger
Extensive consensus exists in the post 9/11 IR literature that the terror-
ist events of that fateful day have radically changed how America and
Americans perceive the world – that the world is indeed ‘a jungle full of
poisonous snakes’ in which a hegemonic power has never been as de-
spised and vulnerable. It seems to be the case, however, that this domi-
nant discourse is overly generalising. The 9/11 incidents have no doubt
affected America’s perspectives, perceptions and policies in a radical way
but this change is mostly in relation to the Third World, not the world in
general. The reason is not far-fetched. The architects of the 9/11 attacks
were members of an extremist Islamist terrorist group from the Third
World – a region that given the extensive asymmetrical power relations
between the global North and South should by no rational calculation
be able to accomplish a colossal security assault on a world power on its
own soil. Hence, despite the obvious political discord between the Bush
administration and some of the EU states (notably France and Germany),
especially over the Iraq war and the wider contempt of the White House
for multilateralism in the name of upholding America’s national inter-
ests, America’s foreign policy and relations with Europe have not changed
in any significant manner.
One of the specific consequences of 9/11 for Africa, observes Ali
Mazrui (2005:15), is a dawning realisation in the western world that the
Muslim presence on the African continent is far more extensive than
previously imagined. Nearly the entire Arab Maghreb and Sahel regions,
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a greater part of West Africa and the Horn, as well as significant parts of
Central-Eastern and Southern Africa are Muslim populated. Juxtaposed
to the pre-9/11 terrorist bombing of two US embassies in East Africa in
August 1998, the prolonged asylum of Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in
the mid-1990s where Al Qaeda was believed to have been born, and the
perennial Islamist militancy in Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and northern Ni-
geria, this new knowledge informed a disquieting discourse of ‘danger’
to the US and its western allies. Paranoia was not far from the scene.
The US invasion of Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban regime and
apprehend Al Qaeda terrorists and the re-securitisation of the entire
Middle East and Pakistan at the onset of the war on terror further meant
that Africa must be fully drafted in. Senior officials of US European
Command (EUCOM), senior US government officials, CIA counter-
intelligence reports and western media played a big part in the
mainstreaming of Africa using rhetoric and idioms that depicted and
blackmailed Africa as ‘a potential breeding ground’ for Islamist mili-
tancy and ‘a safe haven for terrorists’. EUCOM has been chiefly instru-
mental in sensitising the Washington administration to the huge secu-
rity gaps in Africa, ‘emphasizing the vulnerability of US interests to ter-
ror, criminality and instability’ in the region (CSIS 2005:vii). EUCOM
and other protagonists have spoken ‘in increasingly exaggerated language
of terrorists’ ‘fleeing the war in Afghanistan’ and ‘the crackdown in Paki-
stan’ ‘swarming across the vast, ungoverned and desolate regions of the
Sahara desert – through Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania’ (Keenan
2004a:477; 2007). Specifically, US European Deputy Commander, Air
Force, General Charles Wald reportedly declared:
Although most Americans know very little about the African conti-
nent and understand even less about its politics, it is critical that the
nation focus on this area now to stem the growth of terrorism. North-
ern Africa serves as a transit route for terrorists headed to Europe …
East Africa, particularly, has become a hotbed of Al Qaeda elements.
Western Africa has witnessed dramatic rises in anti-American and
extremist Islamic rhetoric, particularly in northern Nigeria. And in
parts of South Africa, we have no clues what is going on … (Diallo
2005:42).
General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
and the Commander of EUCOM, pointed this out:
We are seeing evidence that terrorism is moving into Africa, especially
the radical, fundamentalist type. The countries on the rim of the
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Mediterranean Sea … Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco …are the
most pressing concern for the Command, but failed states further south
also pose problems. Terrorists see the continent as a place to hide, a
place to train and a place to organize new attacks. While terrorism
based in Africa is a long-term threat to the United States, it is a more
immediate one to Europe. The Mediterranean that separates Africa
from Europe is no longer a physical barrier; it’s a pond that people
can step over (Noticias. info, September 2004).
Richard Haass (2005), Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the US
State Department, added that:
The attacks of September 11 2001 reminds us that weak states can
threaten our security as much as strong ones, by providing breeding
grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug traffickers and
terrorists. Such lawlessness abroad can bring devastation here at home.
One of our most pressing tasks is to prevent today’s troubled coun-
tries from becoming tomorrow’s failed states.
Appraising the terrorist threat in Africa in February 2004, General Charles
Ford declared that ‘the threat is not weakening, it is growing’ and ‘we
can’t just sit back and let it grow’(ETaiwannews.com, 2004). With no
central government for over 14 years, the failed state of Somalia fell
swiftly into the bad faith of protagonists. Somalia has been hyped as a
safe haven for terrorists uprooted from the Middle East and the various
warlords and militia groups in the country are said to be funded by Mid-
dle Eastern terrorist mafia. Nearly all Islamist fundamentalist groups in
North Africa and the Sahel, including those waging political struggles
prior to 9/11 have been branded ‘Al Qaeda subsidiaries’, ‘surrogates’,
‘sympathisers,’ ‘subcontractors’ and ‘beneficiaries of international Jihadist
funding.’ The proximity of North Africa to Europe and the Middle East
has also been exaggerated to allege that terrorist organisations and Al
Qaeda cells from the Sahara are infiltrating Europe through the back-
door (Diallo 2005:25-30). Subsequent incidents of terrorist bombings
in Djerba-Tunisia (April 2002), Mombassa-Kenya (November 2002),
Casablanca-Morocco (May 2003), the repeated terrorist attacks on west-
ern tourists in Egypt before and after 9/11, and the kidnapping of 32
western tourists (mostly Germans and Austrians) in the Algerian desert
(April 2003) have been high-profiled by the US and its allies to declare
Africa north of the equator a zone of terror. A large part of the redefined
‘zone of terror’, especially the Sahel-Central Africa-Great Lakes axis, is
evidently blighted by a convolution of HIV/AIDS pandemic, food defi-
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cits, and paramilitary insurgencies. These trends not only support an
apparent theory that many are vulnerable to recruitment into terrorist
violence in Africa, but also add pathologies of ‘disease,’ ‘peonage’, and
‘disorder’ to the rhetoric of ‘danger,’ ipso facto fulfilling the ideological
conditions for a systematic military securitisation.
Politics of Hegemony and Subjection
US hegemony in the international system and the subjugation and chap-
eroning of Africa and the Third World is clearly an old game that pre-
ceded 9/11 and even the demise of the Cold War. The imposition of
neo-liberal economic reform and structural adjustment programmes (with
all their devastating conditionalities) on many developing countries us-
ing the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a famil-
iar discourse in ‘international political economy’ (IPE) literature
(Hoogvelt 1997; Abrahamson 2000). The ‘invisible hand’ of the US
administration in the prescription and implementation of the IMF/World
Bank neo-liberal therapies in the South from the early 1980s onwards is
best captured by what is known in IPE as ‘the Washington Consensus’ –
referring to the alliance of the two Bretton Woods institutions and the
White House in the programmed manipulation, control and exploita-
tion of the economies of Third World-policy beneficiaries, using such
neo-liberal measures as privatisation of state enterprises, currency de-
valuation, cuts in social spending, crippling credit facilities, debt-equity
swap, and sundry patterns of deregulations. There is an avalanche of
well-grounded empirical studies in both CPE and IPE linking a great
deal of the contemporary economic hardship, state failure, insurgencies,
breakdown in state governing institutions and civil wars in Africa and
elsewhere in the South to the devastating effects of the World Bank/
IMF neo-liberal economic policies.
The Bush administration came to power with a clear agenda of how
to spread, entrench and consolidate American hegemony – a discourse
eloquently articulated in its September 2002 National Security Strategy
(NSS), promulgated one year after 9/11. It suffices to underscore that
the NSS was largely a synthesis of preceding neo-conservative manifes-
tos on the projection of American global hegemony, notably the 1992
Defence Policy Guidance of the older Bush Administration and the 2000
report of the Project for the American Century. Influential drivers of
these preceding manifestos included ex-Deputy Defence Secretary and
until recently World Bank President, Paul Wolfowitz, ex-Defence Sec-
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retary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. Among the
major policy discourses of the NSS are to:
• Maintain America’s unparalleled military strength and dominance;
• Combat global terror, if necessary, by pre-emptive action;
• Enhance American energy security by expanding sources and types of
global energy supplied, especially from the Western hemisphere, Af-
rica, Central Asia and the Caspian region;
• Deter threats against US interests, allies and friends (US State De-
partment 2002).
Whilst these discourses and guidelines could theoretically be well-mean-
ing and constructive, it is, however, evident from unfolding realities that
they represent the hegemonic ideology and imperial project of post 9/11
neo-conservative America. How do the NSS policy discourses interlink
the rhetoric of danger and the imperatives of hegemonic domination
and chaperoning of Africa?
Having mapped out Africa north of the equator as a zone of terror,
the US administration has promulgated a range of counter-terrorism
doctrines, policies and strategies. The central aim of the new US initia-
tive or at least the official rhetoric behind it is to develop the counter-
terrorism capacity of African states, enhance state capacities to secure
their borders, and to generally ‘help Africans to help themselves’
(Noticias. info). But beyond the smokescreen and rhetoric of ‘helping
Africans to help themselves’ lies America’s strategic design to project its
national power and ensure the domination, chaperoning, supervision
and conformity of Africa to the goal and imperatives of US imperial
governance. African governments and regional organisations have all been
mobilised in pursuit of the American post 9/11 imperial vision and are
now being constantly pressured, blackmailed and monitored to stay on
track. At the behest of the US administration, the AU has established in
Algiers an African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
(ACSRT) to bolster the capacity of the Union in the prevention and
combating of terrorism in Africa through research, documentation, in-
formation dissemination, training, and seminars. The ACSRT is largely
funded by the US and other western partners. The choice of Algiers as
location for the ACSRT is strategic. The main reason for the choice is
that the Algerian government is one of the staunchest allies of the Bush
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administration in the war on terror in Africa and there is a logic of vital
mutual interests at play in the bilateral engagement. For its part, the US
is interested in securing Algerian oil and gas resources for both itself and
major European allies. Consequently, Washington is interested in keep-
ing the Islamists in Algeria and North Africa at bay to ensure that they
do not pose any serious threats to US and western energy security inter-
ests as they have done in the Persian Gulf. President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika’s government in Algeria, on the other hand, is desperate to
acquire modern American military weapons to strengthen its under-
equipped army embroiled in a long-drawn-out battle with various local
Islamist groups since 1992. The armed struggle arose in the aftermath
of the government’s annulment of the January 1992 Algerian parlia-
mentary elections in a bid to prevent the radical Islamic Salvation Front
(known by its French acronym, FIS) from ascending to power and possi-
bly imposing an Iranian Islamic republic model. France (Algeria’s former
colonial power) and the US have backed the Algerian government in the
ensuing disruptive insurgency, which have claimed more than 100,000
lives and many analysts have also implied a Washington-Paris complic-
ity in the 1992 election annulment. The pro-establishment position of
France and US in the conflict has been used by insurgents as an excuse
to specifically target and attack western nationals and tourists in Alge-
ria. Boutefilka and senior Algerian government officials have paid re-
peated visits to Washington since 9/11 to register support for the war on
terror and negotiate military assistance while senior US government of-
ficials have also paid reciprocal visits to Algiers. Under the influence of
the American government and in a bid to attract expanded military as-
sistance (from the Algerian government’s perspective, US military and
financial assistance is still considered inadequate) the Bouteflika gov-
ernment has intensified its crackdown on local opposition and Islamist
groups who are all labelled Al Qaeda affiliates (CFR 2004). Despite the
deplorable human rights conditions, the Algerian government’s massive
crackdown (killing, torture, incarceration) has considerably mitigated local
insurgency and the activities of radical Islamic groups, notably the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA – the paramilitary wing of FIS) and its splinter group,
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), that both seek
to overthrow the regime in Algiers.
Whereas Algiers is America’s outpost for ‘imperial policing’ of the
Arab Maghreb, Bamako-Mali (where the US has an airbase) occupies a
similar position in the Sahel as headquarters for the US Pan-Sahel Ini-
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tiative (PSI) established in November 2002 by the State Department.
Another US ‘policing’ initiative, the East African Counter-Terrorism Ini-
tiative (EACTI), has its operational base in Djibouti. EACTI comes under
the US Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa created in 2002 and
comprises Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Kenya. EACTI is coordinated by some 1,800 US troops from their Camp
Lemonier base in Djibouti and the strategic importance of the base lies
in its proximity to the Arab Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen
– two countries perceived by the US as breeding grounds for interna-
tional terrorism (Diallo 2005). In June 2003, President Bush announced
a $100 million financial provision for the EACTI. Since June 2005, The
Algerian project and PSI have been loosely coalesced to form the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative with the aim of fostering co-opera-
tion between the various states of the two regions classified as ‘terrorist
hotbeds and safe havens’ – Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania,
Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with possibilities of Libya
coming on board as Washington-Tripoli relations improve (Global Secu-
rity 2005). Top military officers of most of the above countries have
taken part in strategic meetings and training programmes at the EUCOM
headquarters in Stuttgart (March 2004) and elsewhere in the west on
the war on terror. EUCOM in partnership with Pentagon and the State
Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is the cen-
tral coordinating agency and clearing-house for all the counter-terrorism
projects in Africa. Through these projects, the US provides military train-
ing and equipment (night vision devices and surveillances systems, as-
sorted conventional weapons, tactical communication gadgets, patrol
jeeps, etc.) to enhance the states’ capacity for rapid response, border
patrol, intelligence monitoring and security cooperation among states.
Thousands of Special US forces, marines and security contractors have
been despatched into various countries to help strengthen the capacity
of local security forces in counter-terrorism. All participating member
states have been compelled to establish counter-terrorism security struc-
tures, mostly involving special departments, field outposts, task forces
and combat squads.
More recently in July 2007, President Bush announced the establish-
ment, with effect from 30 September 2007, of a separate unified com-
batant Command – the United States’ African Command (AFRICOM),
naming distinguished Army General William E. Ward as its first Com-
mander. The Command, which is said to have a trans-military mandate
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(i.e. health, humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and most importantly, mili-
tary) will temporarily operate from the EUCOM facilities in Stuttgart,
Germany until sometime in 2008 when it will eventually be headquartered
in Africa. The Liberian government has already offered to host AFRICOM
amidst pockets of apprehension and opposition from a number of Afri-
can states (notably Nigeria) concerning the implications that the sta-
tioning of American forces in the Gulf of Guinea under any guise would
have for state sovereignty and security of the region (This Day 14.09.07).
In a broad sense, funding of the US counter-terrorism projects in
Africa is interfaced with the US and EU general funding for security
sector reforms (SSR) and support for the development of peacekeeping
capacities of states and regional organisations, and in terms of concrete
dividends, only a few countries have derived significant support
(Washinton Post 2004). As part of the initiatives to support the African
Union peacekeeping operations, especially in Darfur, the US govern-
ment pledged $660 million aid to Africa over a five-year period, out of
which approximately $480 million is targeted for the military sector,
including expanding capacities for counter-terrorism and peacekeeping
(Martin 2004:588; Kitissou 2005:22). A variety of other US tokenistic
aid benefits (mostly bilateral) have followed since then. No doubt, the
enthusiasm (including manifest rhetorical and ideological support) of
participating African governments in the anti-terror campaign remains
substantially high and most regimes are hopeful that the exercise has
prospects of yielding more concrete benefits in due course. As part of
the growing war on terror, President Bush has moved farther and faster
than any recent US administration in constructing a network of military
and political alliance, with military-to-military linkages being expanded
all across the continent (Martin 2004:587).
Another dimension of the post-9/11 stretching of the anti-terrorist
dragnet is that sections of American intelligentsia (and the rest of the
West, to a lesser extent) have increasingly tried to draw a connection
between the African diaspora populations and allegations/potential of
both terrorism and political insurgency in their home countries on the
African continent. The intellectual precursor of this ‘wild chase’ goes
back to the various works of the World Bank Development Research
Group in the 1990s to early 2000s suggesting that through their finan-
cial remittances to their families, relatives and so forth, the African
diaspora plays a prominent role in promoting domestic insurgencies and
armed conflicts in their home countries (cf. Collier & Hoefller 2000;
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Collier 2000a; Collier 2000b).  Expounding the viewpoint that the Afri-
can diaspora provide ‘financial safe havens’ conducive to terrorist activi-
ties, Andre Le Sage (2007:9-10) of the US National Defence Univer-
sity – an ideological think-tank of the Pentagon – argues that:
African countries are [also] vulnerable to terrorist efforts to mobilize
and transfer funds for their operational purposes. An estimated $125
billion moves through the remittance, or hawala, economy each year,
and many countries are highly dependent on remittances for their
financial well-being. Remittance systems are largely unregulated ar-
rangements for money transfers based on trust. They are particularly
popular among diaspora communities to send relatively small amounts
of money to family abroad in a way that helps avoid taxes and fees
and reaches locations where traditional banks are not present. Inter-
national pressure has induced larger remittance companies to adopt
some minimum standards of information collection regarding custom-
ers. However, efforts that over-regulate or close remittance companies
do not stop the practice of hawala, but rather they push it further
underground and out of sight. There is also the special case of South
Africa …, which has sophisticated financial systems that are not yet
adequately monitored or regulated and may be subject to abuse.
It is a priori connections and exaggerations such as the above that ac-
count for the growing tendency of undue suspicion, profiling, surveil-
lance, monitoring and persecution of many Africans by the state security
apparatuses in the US and a number of other western countries in the
aftermath of the events of 9/11 2001.
It is significant that while the US administration largely (but not ex-
clusively) securitises the military aspects of the war on terror in Africa,
its closest western ally, the UK government mainly securitises the devel-
opmental aspect – problems of economic decline and poverty believed
to catalyse Africans’ vulnerability to recruitment into international ter-
rorism. Ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa and his
G8 diplomacy have solidly articulated the rhetoric of ‘war against pov-
erty’ in Africa, and these initiatives are not without some positive im-
pact or prospect. ‘For the British government, the “war on terrorism”
and the “war on poverty” are two sides of the same coin’ (Abrahamson
2004:681). Both allies also operate a bit of each other’s specialism in
the anti-terrorism campaign. The Bush administration has considerably
increased its development budget for Africa while the Blair government
launched a mainstream counter-terrorism programme for Africa, Asia
and the Middle East in May 2003.
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Exaggeration, Deception, Manipulation and Counter-hegemony
Clearly, one is not saying that there are no terrorists in Africa. To make
any such claim or denial would be as ridiculous as asserting that there
are no terrorists in the Middle East or Europe for that matter. At the
same time, there are gradations of conflict-prone, war-torn and dysfunc-
tional states in Africa. Indisputably, many African states lack the capac-
ity and resources to extend state governance institutions and de facto
political power to the entire geodemographic space that falls under the
juridical sovereignty of the state. Also, the porosity of African states’
national borders is a well-known fact. In effect, the case built up to
securitise and mainstream Africa into the war on terror has considerable
elements of truth. But one must hasten to add that these are half-truths.
The narratives of protagonists of post-9/11 imperial governance and anti-
terrorism campaign in Africa are founded on the age-old axiom that ‘it is
easier to twist a half-truth than to tell an outright lie’. Given Africa’s
position of weakness (in political, economic and discursive terms) one
would almost certainly get away with a twisted allegation that terrorists
are roaming the vast open Sahara as opposed, for instance, to a similar
allegation that terrorists are marauding the vast open Australian desert.
Whereas the Australian government could easily navigate and investi-
gate its desert to ascertain the veracity of the report, most states in the
Sahara may not bother to verify the news in the first place, not only
because they may not have the resources to do so, but also because the
Sahara is a shared open desert with more than nine state stakeholders.
Shared deserts are by nature difficult to police, not least by poor and
beleaguered states. It is such natural and structural disadvantages that
protagonists of the war on terror exploit to twist and exaggerate charges
of terrorism in Africa.
A related point is that allegations of terrorism and the campaign to
combat it serve the dual interests of the neopatrimonial elites and gov-
ernments of most countries in the terror zone who are also loyal allies in
the war on terror. Firstly and on the external front, the phenomena help
the African political regimes to hobnob and romance with the US and its
western allies with the aim of securing financial and military aid, as well
as debt forgiveness and general support for development programmes.
From the perspective of the African governments, supporting the US-
led anti-terrorism campaign is a much preferred conditionality for exter-
nal aid than the World Bank/IMF stricture – a more rigorous and crip-
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pling package that the anti-terror alliance has shown prospects of abat-
ing. In his review of how the US Africa policy has changed post 9/11,
William Martin pointed out that in the starker post 9/11 era, the lan-
guage of imposing neo-liberal development and democratisation has been
replaced by the language of demand for support for the war on terror
(Martin 2004:586).
On the domestic front, the anti-terror campaign provides Africa’s
political regimes with a great opportunity to, with the blessings of the
west, persecute and liquidate political opposition, including rival
ethnonational groups and communities, under trumped-up terrorism
charges. Under the disguise of fighting terrorism, old political scores are
unravelled and news frontiers of opposition are imagined and confronted
with brutality by regimes already profoundly threatened by a nemesis of
chronic corruption and misrule. The governments of Mali and Niger have
increasingly incriminated their disgruntled Tuareg minorities and other
excluded nomadic desert tribes in the war on terror – potentially restive
groups that have protested their exclusion with mass rebellions in the
1990s – and have on that premise carried out a systematic persecution
of these groups (Keenan 2004b:693; 2006). Occasional incidents of or-
dinary highway and desert robbery in these minority regions have been
blown-up and attributed to ‘local terrorists’. The embattled governments
of Mauritania and Chad have linked recent incidents of attempted mili-
tary coups in their countries to dissidents of local and external Islamist
elements opposed to their pro-western stance on the war on terror. These
fictitious explanations that say nothing about the crony capitalism, tribal
prebendalism and unpopular foreign policies of these regimes – palpa-
ble symptoms of misgovernance that have fuelled local discontent and
rebellion – have been used as an excuse to crackdown on disgruntled
desert nomads, as well as to blackmail unfriendly neighbouring govern-
ments alleged to have sponsored the terrorism-related abortive coups.
The desperate initiatives of some local African governments overwhelmed
by the challenges of regime survival in orchestrating and twisting allega-
tions of terrorism is always a welcome news for western governments
and media because they reinforce the discourse of ‘danger in the jungle’
and the need for anti-terror militarisation. In a similar vein, Jeremy
Keenan and other recent researchers have uncovered an increasing amount
of evidence to suggest that the high-profiled Algerian hostage-taking
incident of April 2003 variously attributed to Mokhtar ben Mokhtar (a
local Islamist warlord) and famous GSPC leaders like Hassan Hattab
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and Abderrezak Lamari, was initiated and orchestrated by elements within
the Algerian military establishment, with a possible US complicity, to
hype the vulnerability of the Sahara to terrorism (Keenan 2004a:482-
485). This sort of conspiracy is not far-fetched because deception, exag-
geration and alarmism are all a well acknowledged part of the stylistics
of the anti-terror crusade.
From Nouakchott to Djibouti, from Abuja to Cairo, African govern-
ments are chaperoned to prove what Mazrui (2005:15) calls ‘their anti-
terrorist credentials to the United States’ and this pressure drives many
regimes to step up repression of sections of the local Muslim populations.
State-society relations become more fractured and fragmented. Intense
pressure has also been brought on many African states to adopt and
implement anti-terrorism legislation, a process that the State Depart-
ment supervises through the various counter-terrorism initiatives. The
US is expanding the number of its air bases and landing rights in Africa
and elsewhere in the global South.
A major fallout of the anti-terrorist campaign in Africa is its inflam-
mation of Islamist fundamentalism and anti-Americanism. In other words,
the campaign activates and inflames discourses and activisms of coun-
ter-hegemony. The civil and uncivil societies in Africa are increasingly
incensed by America’s invasion and arrogant display of power, and this
has led to protests against satellite regimes entangled in the imperial
agenda. Consequently, anti-American and, to a lesser extent, anti-west-
ern sentiments have fed into and aggravated Christian-Muslim relations
because of the evident import of ‘civilisational warfare’ that derives from
the campaign. It also pitches radical Islam against the moderate wing,
further proliferating the frontiers of violent and structural sectarian con-
flicts. The structures of these religious conflicts often intersect with other
structures of identity and fragmentation in both the state and society
(notably race and ethnicity), which potentially make them more deadly
and devastating. The impact of these devastating conflicts could be seen
in Sudan, Guinea, northern Nigeria, Algeria, Mauritania, Chad, and Mali.
At another level, the repeated rhetoric of ‘danger in the jungle’ yam-
mered by international media and various western governments in their
travel advice to their nationals has extensively damaged the desert, beach
and safari economies of the Maghreb, Horn and Great Lakes regions
that are largely dependent on international tourism. This phenomenon
has thrown many locals out of jobs and reduced the fortune of the local
tourist economies. People are naturally exasperated. Discourses and effu-
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sion of counter-hegemony sentiments and anti-Americanism are inevi-
table in the circumstance. Vulnerability to terrorist recruitment – the
very thing dreaded by the West – becomes more likely.
The strong connection between the war on terror and the US energy
security, especially the need to secure expanded and uninterrupted oil
supplies from the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere in Africa to compensate
for the intermittent shortfalls from the highly volatile Persian Gulf is
well documented in IPE literature and cannot be revisited here for lack
of space. Suffice it to highlight that America is currently energising the
Gulf of Guinea Commission, a regional security organisation proposed
by ex-President Obasanjo of Nigeria for the key oil-producing states of
Angola, Cameroun, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and
Nigeria to help co-ordinate peace and security programme within the
region. In 2004, EUCOM commenced the development of a coastal se-
curity programme in the region known as the Gulf of Guinea Guard on
account of its estimation of vulnerability and threats to the US exten-
sive oil investments in the region (CSIS 2005:14). The ultimate plan of
EUCOM is to integrate the Gulf of Guinea security agenda into the
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative. ‘According to the US National
Intelligence Council, the United States, in diversifying its sources of oil,
can be expected to increase its reliance on the Gulf of Guinea from the
current level of 15 per cent to 25 per cent of US oil imports by 2015’
(CSIS 2005:13). US strategic energy sources estimate that the Gulf of
Guinea will enjoy over $33 billion in onshore and offshore oil invest-
ments from 2005-2015, more than 40 per cent of which must come from
American companies (CSIS 2005:24). The US partly wants to use its
vast military and political influence over the Gulf of Guinean states to
keep the Chinese at bay against the backdrop of the dramatic increase in
Chinese competition and the share of African oil investments and sup-
plies in recent years.
Conclusion
The US-led war on terror marks the apogee of American imperial gov-
ernance, global domination and politics of chaperoning the relatively
weak African states – processes that tend to aggravate the crisis of
postcoloniality on the continent. Antecedents of this phenomenon abound
in the past and contemporary projects of western imperial stereotyping,
subjection, supervision and governance of Africa and the Third World.
The war on terror converges and expresses the various strands of this
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hegemonic politics – international militarism, preemptive warfare,
unilaterialism, expanded control over external oil resources, and ‘embel-
lished’ developmentalism. To deliver this imperial project in Africa,
transhistorical discourses and metaphors that portray the continent as a
timespace of unmitigated danger and infantilism are reinvented to win
support and justification for the project. Like in preceding phases and
dispensations of extraversion, most African post-colonial governments
have cashed in on the opportunities and possibilities intrinsic to the
anti-terror campaign (albeit, not without considerable pressure from the
western protagonists) to shore up their highly beleaguered regimes and
re-assert their hegemonies.
The current wave of Islamist terrorism with its proclivity to suicide
bombing clearly horrifies and puzzles modern western sensibilities. From
the perspective of right wing conservative America and the west, it is
only the modernity-resistant bad Muslims of African and Middle East-
ern origin that are capable of such savagery (see Mamdani 2004:19).
Without delving into the historical antecedents and motivations of Is-
lamist terrorism, it suffices to say that Islamist terrorism and terrorist
attacks of all kinds are bad for the west, bad for Africa and the Middle
East and bad for humanity. As Boroumand and Boroumand (2002:6)
have argued, contemporary forms of Islamist terrorism are an ideologi-
cal and moral challenge to both traditional Islam and liberal democracy
woven from appeals to tradition, ethnicity and historical grievances both
old and new, along with a powerful set of religious sounding references
to ‘infidels’, ‘idolaters’, ‘crusaders’, ‘martyrs’, ‘holy wars’, ‘sacred soil’,
‘enemies of Islam’, ‘the party of God’, and the ‘great Satan’. These dis-
courses, rhetoric and metaphors are as unsavoury as some of the
transhistorical discourses and stereotypes on Africa highlighted in the
forgoing analysis. Such constructs and discourses would always lead to
hate and contempt, domination and resistance, violence and war. What
we see in the war on terror is a ‘hysterical overreaction’ (Mueller
2005:229) to an exaggerated security threat. John Mueller (2005:208)
has demonstrated in a recent empirical study that exaggeration of for-
eign threats and overreaction to them, as exemplified by the current
concerns over international terrorism, have remained a common feature
of the US foreign policy, at least since 1945. As the consequences have
shown, the present war on terror is apparently a bad response to a bad
phenomenon, hence the seemingly bad outcome.
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In the final analysis, the war on terror is its own nemesis. The cam-
paign is conducted and conveyed in a manner and style that seems calcu-
lated to humiliate, subjugate and infuriate the Third World. The Ger-
man news magazine Der Spiegel pre-9/11 criticism that by its military
unilateralism the US was conducting itself ‘as the Schwarzenegger of
international politics: showing off muscle, obtrusive, intimidating’ (quoted
in Rapkin, 2005:396) cannot be more appropriate. Unlike previous con-
ventional wars and the Cold War prosecuted by the US that had clearly
identifiable adversaries, America has today stretched itself too thinly in
a costly and seemingly endless war against more or less globalised invis-
ible adversaries. If the war drags on, one cannot rule out the tendency
that many children yet unborn in parts of the global South could grow
up, become radicalised and opt to continue the guerrilla fight because of
its intrinsic Armageddonic discourse. Given that this is a war unlikely to
ever produce a decisive winner in both the short and long run, it is al-
most inevitable that the US government would at some point rethink its
present bellicose foreign policy. With more than 3,800 American sol-
diers killed and over 8,000 wounded in the Iraq war (figures as at Sep-
tember 2007), the Bush administration has come under increasing do-
mestic pressure from sections of the American public and Congress to
withdraw American troops from the war-torn Gulf state. But markedly
concerned with face-saving, it is unlikely that the present tough-talking,
neo-conservative regime in Washington would easily yield to domestic
pressure and pull out American forces from Iraq. Unless the insurgents
in Iraq are able to gain and maintain a devastating combat advantage
over the US-led coalition forces – a scenario that is most unlikely –
domestic political pressure in the US may not succeed in compelling the
Bush administration to withdraw American forces. A post-Bush White
House is therefore more likely to rethink, reinvent and mellow Ameri-
ca’s imperial governance project, and possibly bring the Iraq war to an
end – most likely, without a decisive winner. But whether that is likely to
fundamentally affect the way Africa is perceived, constructed, portrayed
and chaperoned is a completely different ball game. The politics and
methods of imperial supervision could change, but one cannot be so
certain about the underlying philosophy, ideology and stereotypes.
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Notes
1 The international system is the metaphoric ‘macro-jungle’.
2. Mohammed Ayoob has reclassified the Third World into two. The new Third
World refers to states in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans that have
emerged out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dismember-
ment of Yugoslavia. The post-colonial states of Africa, Asia and Latin America
traditionally considered as the Third World are re-defined as the old Third
World. The two Third Worlds are described as broadly sharing similar char-
acteristics. See, M. Ayoob, 2001, ‘State Making, State Breaking and State
Failure’ in Chester A. Crocker et al, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Man-
aging International Conflict. Washington, USIP Press, pp. 127-128.
3 ECOWAS stands for Economic Community of West African States, AU is
the African Union and SADC is the Southern African Development Com-
munity.
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